Submission - Parts 2 & 3
is how option4.co.nz is expressing the 4 Principles in its full
submission. This is the result of many days work by a number of
very experienced authors.
|Contained in this document:
- Part 2 - The interface between Public
Rights in the fishery and the Commercial sector,
and the 3 Options in "Soundings."
- Part 3 - Management, Funding and
Back to Part 1
here » »
option4 Submission to Rights Working Group on Soundings
The interface between Public Rights in the fishery and the
Commercial sector, and the 3 Options in "Soundings."
The Soundings document states:
"The Vision has healthy coastal fisheries as a central component.
There is also a desire to have cooperative working relationships
with customary and commercial fishers, and involvement of the public
in fisheries management. Improving the management of recreational
fishing will need to recognise:
- customary fishing rights for managing the taking of seafood
for customary purposes
- the government's sustainability, environmental and Treaty obligations
- the quota management system because the government will not
abolish this system for managing commercial fisheries
- the need to consider costs and benefits (economic and environmental)
of any proposals."
Nothing in this submission is intended to affect customary fishing
rights for managing the taking of seafood for customary purposes.
option4 does, however, have grave concerns over the current interpretation
(in Soundings) of the strength of the commercial rights for species
managed under the QMS and those fisheries managed outside the QMS.
Both Options 2 & 3 of Soundings promotes a proportional public
share integrated with commercial fishers under the QMS.
option4 has grave concerns regarding the compatibility and suitability
of a system designed to control commercial fishing (the QMS) to
deliver outcomes favourable to the various existing public rights
to harvest seafood. These rights cannot be expressed as a simple
minor shareholding in a privately held property right.
The following examples of continued erosion of noncommercial fisheries
have happened while the government has been charged with the responsibility
of management. option4 knows there is no chance the noncommercial
sector could resolve these issues as 2% stakeholders in New Zealand's
fisheries as proposed in Soundings.
During the 1970's and up until the inception of the QMS, inshore
fishstocks were massively overfished by an overcapitalised inshore
commercial fishery. The public were disenfranchised from their fishery
through this period as prime inshore stocks were fished near to
collapse. Catch rates for amateur and sustenance fishers plummeted
during these years.
It is clear from the preliminary documentation and original interpretation
of the ITQ right that concerns raised by noncommercial fishers at
the time were ignored, as were those of Maori.
Initially, quotas were set at the upper limits of fishing, that
would, according to the science of the day, allow the stocks to
recover. Despite being compensated $46 million to reduce effort
in these depleted fisheries, the industry found several ways of
increasing their profits and quota holdings which circumvented the
intent of the QMS.
The Quota appeals authority(QAA), which was set up to hear claims
from fishers dissatisfied with their allocations, was subject to
a rush of claims from commercial fishers. Most were successful and
quota on some important inshore species like snapper were inflated
by around 30%. The quotas generated by the successful QAA appeals
should have been absorbed into the Total Allowable Commercial Catch
(TACC) but were allowed to accumulate above the scientifically set
levels the industry had been compensated to accept. While some snapper
quotas were eventually cut back to near the original quota levels,
most QAA issued quota is still held by the fishing industry, unjustly
inflating the commercial share at the expense of the access of all
noncommercial users interested in those fisheries.
Quotas on many shared inshore stocks are set so high they do no
constrain commercial effort whatsoever. Blue cod, flatfish, grey
mullet, gurnard, hapuku, bass, john dory, tarakihi, trevally are
in this category. At best this confounds the allocation issue. Is
the commercial share, under Options Two and Three in Soundings,
to be based on an amount of fish the commercial sector cannot currently
catch just because they have quota for it? At worst this leaves
noncommercial fishers competing against commercial fishers who can
deplete a harbour or whole Quota Management Area (QMA ) until it
is no longer economically viable to commercially fish there. This
can leave amateur fishers to struggle trying to catch any legal
sized fish missed by the commercial sector. In the following year,
as the fishery is starting to recover the commercial fishers can
return and repeat the exercise. Scallops, the Tauranga harbour dragnetting
saga, the Kaipara, Manukau, Raglan, Kawhia and Aotea Harbour's flounder
and mullet conflicts are examples of this flaw in the QMS.
Since the inception of the QMS other commercial methods of increasing
their profits at the expense of other users have been well documented
and are covered elsewhere in this document.
In "Soundings," Option 1 allows for the continual erosion
of the public right to recreationally fish and harvest seafood.
Options 2 and 3 will make the public a minor shareholder in a commercial
fishery. option4 rejects options 1, 2 and 3.
option4 considers implementing the following two principles
the only just way to resolve the above issues:
- A priority public right that is equal to or, in recognition
of the Crown's Treaty of Waitangi obligations, slightly lesser
than Maori Traditional rights while being above, or in priority
to, Commercial fishing rights.
- An area right which will allow for the exclusion of Commercial
methods that deplete fish stocks in areas important to the non-commercial
fishing public, or hinders their ability to reasonably access
those fish stocks in which they have an interest.
The Public and the Quota Management System
Overview - Threats to the publics harvest.
The Introduction of the Quota Management System (QMS) in 1986 was
a major change in the way fisheries were managed and lead to a restructure
of commercial fishing. There were many winners, who were gifted
valuable catch rights based on their catch history and many losers,
such as hundreds of part time fishers, who got nothing. Many commercial
fishers, disenchanted with the QMS and the new paper work sold their
quota to the corporate fishing companies or Government and looked
for other work.
The initial allocation of fishing rights under the Quota Management
System had not made provision for Maori. The Muriwhenua claim to
the Waitangi Tribunal successfully established the political right
to a share of fisheries resources for Maori. Considerable effort
and expense was involved in allocating Maori commercial and customary
rights. There is an ongoing commitment by Government and the Treaty
of Waitangi Fisheries Commission to the implementation of Maori
Claims have been made that the New Zealand QMS is the best fisheries
management system in the world, the envy of many nations. Yet in
the 14 years since its introduction no other country has embraced
Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) so fully. It is a economic model
based on individual property rights deriving from the objective
of commercial utilisation of the resource.
There are a number of assumptions, pointed out by the Parliamentary
Commissioner for the Environment (December 1999), that have had
a marked influence on the evolution of fisheries management and
the Quota Management System in New Zealand. These include:
The belief that clearly defined property rights will lead to sustainability
That within such property rights frameworks, sustainability can
be achieved by focusing on a few target species and thus working
the system on a species by species basis.
The expectation that defining property rights will lead to effective
collaboration between rights holders The political belief that clearer
property rights will reduce the costs and risks to the state.
The Commissioner for the Environment also points out that there
is ample evidence from land and forest management experience world
wide that the existence of property rights to natural resources
does not guarantee that they will be managed in a way that ensures
the resources are sustained in the long term.
option4 also rejects Options 2 and 3 on the following grounds:
Recreational and subsistence fishers are not convinced that a property
rights regime will meet their long term objectives for maintaining
and improving the quality of the public fishery and their individual
option4 is specifically concerned with the following risks associated
with the QMS and the potential to cause further erosion of the public
share. option4 believes that the closer the public right is aligned
with the commercial rights under the QMS, the greater these risks
Dumping of commercial catch in excess of quota.
Dumping of unwanted commercial by-catch.
Dumping of commercial overcatch catch through lack of vessel holding
Highgrading of commercial target catches for economic and quality
Quotas issued through the Quota Appeals Authority inflating commercial
quota at the expense of other users and sustainability.
Blackmarketing of unreported commercial catches. Fisher fraud, misreporting
of catches by commercial fisherman. Corporate fraud, misreporting
or non-reporting by large quota holding entities and exporters.
Deeming of catch to the Crown, in excess of sustainable limits,
caused by an inappropriate quota holding or quota lease for the
method or fishery the vessel is operating in.
Wastage caused by inefficient fishing gear.
Wastage caused by non-selective fishing gear.
Wastage caused by the loss of experienced fishers, and their replacement
with inexperienced novices, through high costs of leasing quota
and low landed prices.
TARGETING OF BYCATCH SPECIES
Targeting of species important to noncommercial fishers, which are
outside the QMS to avoid quota costs and retain profitability and
build catch histories.
LOSSES IN YIELD
Loss of yield through harvesting important species, shared with
other users, at sizes that are well below the sizes that will produce
the maximum yield per recruit.
Lack of incentives in the QMS for individual commercial fishers
and/or quota holders to conserve and enhance fishstocks.
The preference of the fishing industry toward high-risk harvesting
strategies instead of a precautionary approach in species managed
within the QMS.
The race to build catch history in fisheries outside the QMS often
leading to overfishing and a stock depleted below MSY
Recreational quota or shareholdings like the proportional share
system promoted in Options 2 and 3, linked in any form to Commercial
rights, or able to be negatively impacted on by Commercial behaviour
and / or harvest strategies, is totally and completely rejected
by option4 as an unnecessarily high risk strategy. Recreational
quota will require extensive bureaucracy, policing and rules for
little or no real gains. Quota-based or proportional options have
a real chance of outcomes for noncommercial fishers directly opposite
to the rosy picture painted in the"Soundings" document.
Managing a Fisheries Property Right
The cornerstone of the QMS is the setting of an annual Total Allowable
Catch (TAC) for a species and then the ability to manage the fishery
within that limit. As any commercial fisher will tell you, managing
the QMS is not simple. There are lists of reporting requirements
and ways of covering catch when you don't have the quota. These
include: Catch and Effort forms, Licensed Fish Receiver Forms, Quota
Management Reports, Quota Lease agreements, Fish Against Another's
Quota (FAAQ) forms and Catch Against Another's Quota (CAAQ) forms
and if they still can't balance quota and catch, fishers can pay
the Deemed Value for any excess.
A very expensive database was created to store this information
and a validation system was set up to check what is put in. In fact,
because of the legal status of the information entered on the forms
they have to be entered exactly as written, errors and all. This
means that when pulling data out of the system it must be carefully
groomed before it can be believed. All this effort (and more) goes
into estimating one part of the equation: "what commercial
fishers catch". But even this is an assumption. The whole commercial
Quota Management Database only records "what commercial fishers
tell you they catch".
"The principal effect of the various administrative systems,
and now statutory amendments to the Fisheries Act 1996, has been
to allow commercial fishers to avoid the ultimate point of the QMS,
namely to limit the quantity of fish taken to the quantity of quota
held." (from the report of the Parliamentary Commissioner for
the Environment page 53) The option4 group sees that after 14 years
the assumptions of commercial rights based model are still not being
met for the commercial sector. option4 certainly does not want to
see the Public rights in the fishery to be expressed as a minor
shareholding in such a system as is proposed in Options 2 and 3
Information and Decision Making
We recognise it is the Minister of Fisheries who is ultimately responsible
for setting sustainable limits for our fisheries resources. He or
she will do this based on the best available biological information
and estimates of the total commercial catch, estimates of the total
recreational catch, and estimates of the Maori customary catch provided
by the Ministry. Where that information is uncertain, unreliable
or inadequate the Minister must act cautiously.
Snapper is the most researched species in NZ. Some of the top fishery
researchers have fed more and more data into increasingly complex
mathematical models, yet there is still considerable uncertainty
about what the current biomass is and what the maximum sustainable
yield is, hence the need for another tagging programme for the North
Island west coast (SNA8), and more importantly for SNA1 (BOP, Hauraki
Gulf and east Northland).
For many of the other key recreational species in New Zealand there
is only limited knowledge of customary, commercial and recreational
harvest, natural mortality, biomass and Maximum Sustainable Yield
and there is considerable uncertainty in the TAC's set for these
species. The Minister must take a more precautionary approach and
manage conservatively especially when potential overfishing will
adversely affect the public share.
The QMS needs good quality scientific and harvest data to work.
Incorporating recreational and subsistence fishing into the QMS
would require frequent expensive surveys to monitor harvest plus
more intensive management. Much more money would be needed for education
and enforcement as rules and restrictions change.
option4 group knows that there is considerable uncertainty in the
stock assessments and yield estimates. The Minister should take
a precautionary approach to fisheries management considering the
quality of data that he or she receives. The Public do not want
an expensive QMS style management system for recreational fisheries.
Maximum Sustainable Yield
Is a system designed to extract the maximum commercial meatweight
from a fishery capable of fulfilling the needs of non-commercial
The focus of the Fisheries Act 1996 is "sustainable utilisation".
In the Act sustainability is described by Maximum Sustainable Yield
(MSY). However there is no single number that defines MSY for any
fishery. Although open to interpretation MSY is a useful tool for
defining a level of fishing pressure that (in theory) maximises
the annual growth (yield) in that stock. Having a high proportion
of young fish that grow fast, and are quickly replaced if caught,
produces a higher annual yield than large old fish.
Fisheries managed with the goal of maximising the biological yield
will seldom produce quality recreational and sustenance fisheries,
particularly when the best estimates of harvest or sustainable yield
for many species are poor.
For example: Kingfish and kahawai are both important gamefish/ sportfish
as well as being highly sought after by most other noncommercial
and customary users. Managing fisheries such as these under the
Maximum Sustainable Yield harvest strategy removes 75% of the biomass
during the fish-down phase at best, or will leave the fishery near
collapse at worst. The larger fish, removed during the fish-down
phase, represent a critical loss of value to noncommercial fishers.
Our kingfish fishery used to be one of the best in the world, now
sadly most of these world record class fish have been exported to
Japan for sushi; returning the commercial fishermen $5.00 or $6.00
per kilogram. Despite the fact that commercial fishers are not supposed
to target kingfish, unless they have an endorsement on their permit
which allows them to do so, a large portion of the fish have been
taken by commercial fishers with no such endorsement. The recreational
sector has gone to great lengths to try to preserve this fishery
by introducing very low bag limits, large size limits and promoting
tag and release fishing. Still the quality of this fishery declines.
In the case of kahawai the commercial fishing industry have used
spotter planes to remove 75% of the once abundant schools, leaving
the recreational fisher, on average, to travel four times as far
as they used to in order to encounter a school of kahawai. In areas
where commercial effort has been concentrated, many recreational
and customary fishers seldom see any schools of kahawai.
The recreational and subsistence fishers want statutory input into
the setting of clear management objectives that include the quality
of key fisheries, not simply the weight of the harvest. Management
objectives such as increasing recreational catch rates or the number
of fish caught over a certain size will be required to change the
focus of fisheries management.
In shared fisheries the option4 group want social, economic and
cultural goals to be addressed when setting Total Allowable Catches.
It is not enough to look at Maximum Sustainable Yield without considering
Maximum Social Yield (benefit), Maximum Economic Yield or Maximum
Cultural Benefit. Legislation must allow for an Optimum Yield to
replace an estimate of Maximum Sustainable Yield when setting quotas
for key inshore and pelagic species.
"Soundings," admits Option 1 will allow for the continual
erosion of the public right to recreationally fish and harvest seafood.
Options 2 and 3 will make the public a minor shareholder in a commercial
fishery. It is unrealistic to expect the public to be able to resolve
the above issue.
option4 totally rejects Options 1, 2 and 3 as presented
in "Soundings", because they are incapable of protecting,
let alone enhancing the public right to fish around New Zealand.
The Crown Position and Public Priority
The Crown, through the Ministry of Fisheries, has allowed the erosion
of public fishing rights through the historical bias it has shown
toward the fishing industry. Initially this erosion occurred through
the Government encouraging and giving assistance to the commercial
sector during the 1970s.
This assistance resulted in gross commercial overfishing of important
inshore stocks in which the public also had an interest. In order
to save the inshore stocks from collapse, and the fishing industry
from destroying itself, the Government introduced the Quota management
system (QMS) in 1986. Despite massive compensation being given to
the commercial sector to reduce fishing effort, the fishing industry
managed to circumvent this limitation by using the Quota Appeals
Authority to inflate their quotas above the scientifically set level,
which Government's own scientists said was the maximum level to
allow the stocks to recover. Serious flaws in the implementation
and enforcement of the QMS has allowed the fishing industry to exploit
a myriad of loopholes which have seriously undermined the potential
of the QMS . Many of these loopholes still exist today.
The New Zealand public is skeptical when the Government boasts of
the QMS being a world leader in fisheries management. While the
QMS may have some benefits in managing commercial fishing, many
of these benefits are at the expense of the rights of all New Zealanders.
The Crown did not question that Traditional Maori Fishing rights
were seriously eroded by the introduction of the QMS, and has subsequently
legislated a priority right in the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) setting
process, and area rights to protect such traditional harvest. The
crown has yet to acknowledge and address the injustice created by
its favouritism of the commercial fishing industry over public access
and harvesting rights in the sea.
The previous Labour Governments' interpretation of the commercial
fishing right under the QMS, and how it interacts with recreational
fishing, appeared to offer redress to the above situation. The following
quote is from Labours' National Policy for Marine Recreational Fisheries:
"Government's position is clear, where a species of fish is
not sufficiently abundant to support both commercial and noncommercial
fishing, preference will be given to noncommercial fishing. This
position reflects Government's resolve to ensure all New Zealanders
can enjoy and benefit from our fisheries."
It now appears that, Government's position is NOT clear. A recent
ministerial reply to a letter from option4 seeking clarification
regarding the status of the statements in the National Policy for
Marine Recreational Fisheries informs us "There is some confusion
about the 1989 fishing policy and I welcome the opportunity to provide
some clarification. The previous Labour Government's fisheries Minister
approved the policy. As Cabinet did not consider it, the policy
does not have the status of a Labour government policy."
If cabinet did not consider it why does the policy infer full Government
support, ie "Government's position is clear," and "This
position reflects Government's resolve."
The recent ministerial reply also states "The situation is
that neither recreational nor commercial have priority over one
The "Soundings "document initiated under a National Government
makes exactly the same comment on page 6. Do both National and Labour
parties have exactly the same fisheries policy, or is this mirroring
of policy an example of strategic policy advisors in the Ministry
of Fisheries driving their own privatisation agenda forward at the
expense of the democratic process?
Whatever the reason for these mixed messages, it is seen by the
overwhelming majority of noncommercial fishers as yet another attempt
to further degrade the public's rights to fish and harvest seafood
as progressive Governments continue to fail to address the fundamental
issue of public fishing rights.
Labours' current fisheries policy ABRIDGED
Greater involvement of all stakeholders in management of the resource,
which is the common heritage of all New Zealanders;
sustainable growth in employment and investment opportunities for
New Zealanders; protecting and enhancing the quality of recreational
fishing available around New Zealand
Recreational fishing is part of the New Zealand way of life.
- ensure New Zealanders continue to enjoy access to the recreational
- not impose a recreational sea fishing licence as a condition
of exercising the individual right to go fishing;
- not require the recreational sector to operate within a quota,
as though it was a commercial fisher;
- recognise the value of recreational fishing to New Zealand©ˆs
option4 cannot see how the Labour Government can possibly achieve
its policy through Options 1,2 and 3 of the Soundings document.
Option 1 allows further erosion of the public right while the other
two options are quota-based and will require some form of compulsory
levy or licence to provide the necessary level of compliance with
that quota. The fishing industry would accept no less under a privatised,
quota-based system. The NZ public are also skeptical that successive
Governments would be able to retain compulsory fees or levies for
fisheries management purposes, or resist the temptation to charge
recreational and sustenance fishers for core Government services
such as research and compliance costs.
The NZ public are no longer naive enough to be fooled into believing
any compulsory tax, levy, tagging scheme, compulsory membership
or membership which grants additional fishing rights to members,
or any other compulsory scheme, is any different to licensing. The
fishing public are also aware that the Option 2 and 3 proposals
in "Soundings" are an initial step toward the privatising
of the public's rights to harvest from the nations fisheries resources.
Options 2 and 3 will also allow the Government to abdicate one of
its core responsibilities, to ensure the public rights in fisheries
are protected, and also to avoid compensation issues where the Crown
has given fish needed by the public, to the commercial sector.
Any such attempts at privatisation are, and will continue to be,
fiercely opposed by option4.
option4 holds the view that recreational fishing is indeed a right,
which needs to be recognised as such. Such rights have priorities
over other activities, a principle well established by Government
with other rights-holders. Rights are not shares.
Some form of public priority must also be given for "protecting
and enhancing the quality of recreational fishing available around
New Zealand" if Labour is to deliver on its "NEW"
The time has come where the Crown must face up to it responsibilities
and resolve the injustices inflicted on the public's fishing rights
created through the prior mismanagement and excessive favouritism
shown to the fishing industry.
Leaving the allocation of the public right to the discretion of
successive Ministers, (Option 1 in "Soundings") is not
supported by option4.
We consider that the public of New Zealand have a "right to
fish". We find the concept of a "recreational share"
unacceptable, and probably unsustainable in law. We don't believe
that it is, or should be, a political decision made by a Minister,
but a preferential right defined in law. Furthermore we believe
it has already been defined in government policy, we simply await
the delivery on that promise.
Management, Funding and Representation
The Soundings document suggests the following management objectives
(the order has been altered for clarity):
1. Recreational fishers can actively participate in management (fisheries
2. A flexible dynamic management system is in place.
3. Good research/recreational harvest information.
4. Good enforcement and high levels of recreational compliance.
5. Sufficient funding exists for recreational fishing management.
6. Productive and cooperative working relationships between fishing
7. The public is involved in processes like research, management
8. There is a statutory-backed network of mandated recreational
9. Collective rights of future generations are protected.
option4 makes the following comments on management:
Objectives I to 5 are seen by option4 as essential in any future
Objective 6 can only evolve over time if the management objectives
of each group are similar. Issues raised in this submission indicate
they are not, and we cannot see how they can be made so under the
three options presented in "Soundings."
Objective 7. The public is already involved through general taxation,
used in funding research and compliance through the Ministry of
Fisheries, and the employment of a Minister of Fisheries at the
taxpayers expense. option4 considers this is appropriate and should
Objective 8. While option4 agrees that there should be a network
of mandated "recreational" groups we feel it is critical
that these groups should be representative of all noncommercial
users including diving, shellfish gathering, set netting, longlining,
and also encompass food gathering/harvesting interests. It should
not be compulsory for citizens to associate themselves with recreational
fishing groups for basic sustenance rights to be recognised and
protected. Most recreational fishing groups are currently relevant
only for those enthusiasts who make a sport or recreational pursuit
out of catching or gathering seafood. It is critical to broaden
the consultative network to include all sectors who could be affected
by decisions made by the consultative group.
We are unconvinced that such bodies need statutory backing and suspect
this is proposed only to allow such statutory bodies to levy or
licence those it would represent.
Objective 9. option4 does not consider the rights of future generations
to be a collective right or a shareholding in a collective, but
a fundamental individual right.
option4 has the following management principles:
- That the priority of recreational and sustenance fishers over
commercial fishers be reinstated.
- That recreational and sustenance fishers be given an area right
capable of excluding bulk commercial methods that deplete important
noncommercial fishing and harvesting areas.
- A planning right that would ensure any fish conserved by recreational
and sustenance fishers could be preserved for future generations
and not be made available to be taken by the commercial sector.
- No licensing, levy or other compulsory funding scheme.
option4 has the additional objectives of:
- Ensuring the development of a funding base sufficient for an
independent representative body to undertake all of its roles
and represent the interests of all non-commercial fishers and
- Ensuring the development of an effective and efficient national
communication and decision making structure.
The Ministry, as agent for the Crown, has demonstrated itself incapable
of, and unwilling to, represent the interests of the public sector
who benefits either directly or indirectly from noncommercial fishing.
As the Ministry now wants to divest itself of any representational
function, option4 advocates a national, independent, publicly elected
body to represent the recreational anglers interests to Government.
It is the strong opinion of option4 that such an independent, non-governmental
body (representing the interests of recreational anglers) should
be funded through central government. We see the advocacy, management
and protection of public rights as a proper function of government,
and there are many different models of allocating funds to achieve
this. We suggest that an activity undertaken by such a large portion
of the population (which also directly benefits the wider public
through the sharing of food gathered), to be at least, if not more
important than, arts for example.
We would point out that through normal taxation large amounts of
GST on recreational equipment and other activities associated with
the fishing public are collected.
Recreational fishers also contribute large sums of road tax and
GST on that road tax from petrol purchased for motors on boats that
don't run on roads. This revenue stream is enough to support funding
this representative group in the activities associated with managing
Government profits from, and has a vested interest in, commercial
overfishing to the extent that it receives revenue through overcatch
that is deemed to the Crown. This is effectively a tax on overfishing
by the commercial sector. All fishing in excess of quota depletes
the resource to a greater extent than the scientifically assessed
safe limit. This overfishing will affect sustainability and any
rebuild strategy in place at the time. The rights of other users
will also be eroded to the extent of the overcatch. The punitive
taxes gathered from commercial overfishing are also an appropriate
source of funding for a recreational representative body.
The fishing industry received compensation of 46 million dollars
in 1986 as a reward for massive overfishing. The fishing industry
is due to receive another round of compensation as a reward for
developing the kingfish and kahawai species as commercial fisheries,
in spite of prior recreational claims that these fisheries were
world class sport and big game fisheries. While this favouritism
of the commercial sector and its associated costs are accepted by
the Government, we cannot understand why the recreational and sustenance
sector has not received financial support for a representative organisation.
It is long past time that they did so.
Maori Traditional harvest will likely increase over time. The Government
will have to ensure fish are available for these purposes and if
necessary, will have to compensate the fishing industry for this
increased harvest, or take it directly from the public share. The
Government seldom resists providing resources for Maori Traditional
harvest, why can it not show the same commitment to the rest of
New Zealanders, including the "many Maori who cannot or choose
not to fish under customary provisions" mentioned in Soundings.
Alternatively the funds could be split directly off from the Fisheries
Soundings discusses the possibility of the Crown assisting with
set up costs of a recreational representative body. Set up costs
without secure ongoing funding will only result in a failure to
achieve the management objectives as discussed.
A variety of additional funding mechanisms are discussed in Appendices
3 and 4.